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INTRODUCTION
Bangladesh has a per capita income of $206 and a gross na-
tional product (GNP) of $26 billion; the People's Republic of Chi-
na has a per capita income of $1,860 and a GNP of $2.0 trillion.'
Despite the obvious disparity between those two countries' econo-
mies, China claims equivalence with Bangladesh for the purpose of
determining the economic category into which the former should
be placed when it joins the World Trade Organization (WTO). 2
The Clinton administration argues that China should be
placed in the same economic level as Japan and the United States
when China joins the WTO.' This dispute has kept China from
joining the WTO because there are far more stringent require-
ments for those WTO members deemed "developed countries"
than for those classified as "developing countries."4 Because Chi-
na possesses the world's third largest economy, it must be integrat-
ed into the international marketplace.' Furthermore, China's out-
sider status prevents its integration into the family of nations,
thereby discouraging the rest of the world from investing in and
trading with China.'
The world trading system has been dominated by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)7 for 50 years Since its
1. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 835 (1996) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. All
monetary figures are in U.S. currency unless otherwise noted.
2. See Jeffrey Parker, China Vows Not to Beg for Trade-Club Membership, TM
REUTER EuR. Bus. REP., Sept. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
China claims to be a "developing" country. Bangladesh, with its very small economy, is
also a developing country. See iL It seems odd to place the two countries in the same
category.
3. See iL (stating that the United States blocked China's accession to GA7IT on the
basis that it did not qualify to join as a developing country).
4. See infra Part I.C.
5. See RICHARD M. NIXON, BEYOND PEACE 121-29 (1994).
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1519
1520 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:1519
inception in 1947, the GATT has brought about a revolution in
the world economy through its promotion of free trade.' Free
trade is vital to the world's economic growth because it ensures
markets for those countries that produce the best products in
certain niches, thereby promoting their continued production."
The alternative, a static system of government subsidies and high
protective tariffs, would result in outdated and unappealing prod-
ucts.,,
Within the GATT framework, the member states participated
in a series of negotiating "Rounds," which have led to a series of
new liberalizing commitments; these agreements were added to the
original GATT agreement. 2 On April 15, 1994, ministers from
over 100 member states of the GATT signed the "Final Act Em-
bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations" (WTO Agreement)," which concluded eight years
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
8. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 293-301 (3d ed. 1995).
9. See id. at 5-6 (stating that the GATT has caused a "significant increase in the
volume of world trade"); World Trade Org., The Foundations of the World Trading Sys-
tem (visited Mar. 9, 1997) <http://www.wto.orglwto2-LO.wpf.html>.
10. See World Trade Org., Implications for Trade in a Borderless World: Address by
Renato Ruggiero, Director-Genera World Trade Organization to the World Trade Con-
gress, Singapore 24 April 1996 (visited Mar. 7, 1997) <http.//www.wto.org/ wto/archives/-
press46.htm>. Director Ruggiero argued that "[a]chieving a genuine world free trade area
would make a tremendous contribution to promoting growth and ensuring a safer world
in the century to come." Id.
11. See The Foundations of the World Trading System, supra note 9. The GATT has
three guiding principles: "(1) elimination and reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to
international economic activity; (2) establishment of predictable, equitable and uniform
rules that are designed to promote strong market economies; and (3) creation of mecha-
nisms to ensure that basic obligations are met and rights are fully respected." Prepared
Testimony of Michael A. Samuels[,j President of Samuels International Associates, Inc.[,]
on Behalf of the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc.[,] Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means Subcomm. on Trade, Fed. News Serv., Sept. 19, 1996 [hereinafter Pre-
pared Testimony of Michael A. Samuels], available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File.
Samuels served as Deputy United States Trade Representative and United States Am-
bassador to the GAT. See id.
12. See generally Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana
Charter to the World Trade Organization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 126-33
(1995) (describing the evolution of the GATT from its inception to the culmination of
the "Uruguay Round").
13. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], reprinted in TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS COMM., FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 5 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL AcT]; 33 IL.M. 1125
(1994).
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of negotiations.'4 It set up a new institution, the WTO, and pro-
mulgated agreements covering a wide range of trade issues.'5
China is currently one of 29 additional nations that have requested
membership in the WTO. 6
The WTO agreement, as successor to the GAIT, incorporates
the original GATT treaty by reference, and adds a series of addi-
tional new agreements designed to further the liberalizing goals
initiated by the GAIT. 7 The most important aspect of the WTO
agreement is its establishment of the WTO institution, the govern-
ing body for all aspects of the agreement.'" In addition to the
creation of this new institution, the WTO agreement includes addi-
tional measures designed to liberalize trade in numerous sectors
previously not covered by the GAIT. 9
14. See World Trade Org., A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round (visit-
ed Mar. 9, 1997) <http:/lwww.wto.orglwtolursumwpf.html>. For a current listing of coun-
try membership in the WTO, see World Trade Org., WTO Membership (visited Mar. 9,
1997) <http:llwww.wto.orglwto/aboutlorgansn6.htm>. The following governments currently
are members of the WTO: Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, European Com-
munity, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guate-
mala, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lesotho,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Repub-
lic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Zam-
bia, and Zimbabwe. See id.
15. See A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 14.
16. See WTO Membership, supra note 14.
17. See A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 14.
18. See id. The WTO is headed by a Ministerial Conference, which meets at least
once every two years. See id. A General Council oversees the actual operation of the
agreement and related decisions on a day-to-day basis. See i The General Council al-
so acts both as a dispute resolution body and as a trade policy review mechanism. See
id. The WTO framework ensures a "'single undertaking approach'" to the implementa-
tion of all results from the Uruguay Round. Id.
19. See id. The WTO agreement includes provisions relating to the following areas of
trade: agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, textiles and clothing, technical
barriers to trade, trade-related investment measures, dumping, customs valuation,
preshipment inspection, rules of origin, import licensing procedures, subsidies and counter-
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,The GATr, and, subsequently, the WTO agreement, required
developed countries to eliminate many domestic regulations impos-
ing barriers to free trade.' ° However, in contrast to developed-
country member states, developing countries admitted to the WTO
are not required to meet most of the trade requirements specified
by the two agreements. 2' Developing countries are allowed to im-
pose barriers to trade because of their perceived need to protect
fragile domestic industries from foreign import competition.' Al-
though developing and developed countries have some different
obligations, under the GATT and the WTO, what constitutes
either a developing or developed country remains largely unde-
fined.' This lack of definition has led to individual, ad hoc re-
sponses in bilateral negotiations, rather than the systematized,
objective resolution promised by the WTO.24
The abstract problem of defining what constitutes a develop-
ing country has led to a serious practical problem. Recently,
China's bid to join the WTO has been blocked because of a dis-
pute over whether China will enter the WTO as a developing or a
developed country.' In 1978 China began a process of economic
liberalization under the late Deng Xiaoping.26 In addition, China
vailing measures, safeguards, trade in services, and trade-related aspects of intellectual
property. See id.
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. See infra Part I.B-C.
22. See infra notes 54-55, 64-66 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 222-37 and accompanying text.
24. See GATT Director General Decries Protectionism, Says New MTN Round May
Not Be the Solution, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 902, 902-04 (May 2, 1984) [hereinafter
GA7T Director General Decries Protectionism]. In fact, the former Director-General of
the GATT, Arthur Dunkel, recognized that a serious structural problem with the GAT'
was that "the status of developing countries is undefined and the special rules applying
to them make no distinction between the different levels of development within the
group [of developing countries]." Id. at 903.
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See Orville Schell, Deng's Revolution, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 1997, at 20, 24. In
1978, Deng embarked on the "second revolution" in China, which involved radical eco-
nomic reform. See id. at 25. He reformed agriculture, encouraged the creation of private
business and foreign investment, and even allowed the first stock markets into China. See
id. In Deng's first year in power, 1978, he stated: "I do not care whether a cat is black
or white so long as it catches mice." Henry A. Kissinger, The Philosopher and the Prag-
matist, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 1997, at 42, 46. With this radical statement, Deng began to
move China away from rigid communist orthodoxies by slowly beginning a liberalization
process and a movement towards a market economy. See id. at 46-47; see also Jackie
Sheehan, Is There Another Tiananmen Uprising in the Offing?, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE
REv., Dec. 1, 1996, at 554 (examining the growth of independent workers' organizations
1522. [Vol. 46:1519
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has become a central power in Asia both militarily and economi-
cally.' Despite its progress in economic liberalization, however,
China continues to impose many barriers to international econom-
ic activity, and still does not have a strong top-to-bottom market
economy.' Consequently, the United States has used its political
clout in the world to keep China from being admitted to the
WTO until China has made more significant concessions toward
opening up its market.29
China's situation is not the only instance where this lack of
definition has been a problem. During the 1980s, there was a
series of disputes over whether certain Newly-Industrializing-Coun-
and the degree of political unrest in China).
27. See Schell, supra note 26, at 20-27; see also Time for U.S. to Focus on China,
STRArrs TIMEs (Singapore), Nov. 21, 1996, at 52 (arguing that "China holds the key to
stability in the Asia-Pacific theatre in which the Americans indubitably have an anchor
role").
28. See Michael Sans et al., A Fast Drive to Riches, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 1997, at 32,
33 (noting that much of the infrastructure of a capitalist economy, including rules and
transparent laws, is lacking, thereby making China's bid to join the WTO much more
difficult).
29. See Testimony of the Honorable Charlene Barshefsky Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Ways and Means Comm., May 23, 1995 (visited Mar. 9, 1997)
<http:J/www.ustr.gov/testimony/barshefsky-2.html> [hereinafter Barshefsky Testimony]; see
also Telephone News Conference with Commerce Secretary Mickey Kantor from New York
City, New York, Fed. News Serv., Nov. 20, 1996 [hereinafter Kantor News Conference],
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File (asserting that progress has been made in
economic relations with China). The process of joining the WTO can be accomplished in
two ways. Prior GATT members can join the WTO by signing the Final Act of the Uru-
guay Round, and non-GATl members may only accede to the WTO through "terms
agreed with [other] WTO members." World Trade Org., How the WTO Works (visited
Mar. 9, 1997) <http'//www.wto.org/wtolwtoworks_.wpf.html>. For non-GATr members,
during the initial stage "of the accession procedures the applicant government is required
to provide the WTO with a memorandum covering all aspects of its trade and economic
policies having a bearing on WTO agreements. This memorandum becomes the basis for
a detailed examination of the accession request in a working party." Id. After the paper-
work is submitted, "the applicant government engages in bilateral negotiations with inter-
ested member governments to establish its concessions and commitments on goods and its
commitments on services." IL Only after this bilateral process is complete does the
applicant's petition go to the General Council or the Ministerial Conference for a vote
where two-thirds of the members must agree. See id. Within the last year China was still
in the bilateral negotiation process. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 1995
Annual Report Annex I, WTO Accession Application and Status (as of 1 Mar. 1996)
(visited Mar. 9, 1997) <http:/www.ustr.govlreportsltpa/1996/accession.html>. The United
States will keep blocking China's entry into the WTO during the bilateral discussions
until China makes "specific commitments to open its market for goods and services."
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign
Relations Comm., June 5, 1996 (Testimony of Ambassador Jennifer Hillman) (visited Mar.
9, 1997) <http'/www.ustr.govltestimony/hillman-l.html>.
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tries (NICs), such as South Korea and Singapore, should receive
the benefits of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a
GATT program for developing countries." In addition, a number
of other emerging economies who seek membership in the WTO,
such as Russia and Vietnam, face the same issues and disputes
over definition.3
Part I of this Note describes the specific provisions, both in
the old GATT and in the current WTO agreement, that offer
special protection for developing country members. Part II ex-
plores the current dispute with China, indicates the necessity of
admitting China to the WTO, and explores the potential inequities
in allowing China, and other similarly situated emerging econo-
mies, to take advantage of provisions that were designed to help
extremely poor and undeveloped countries. Part III offers three
suggestions for improving the WTO treaty. First, the WTO should
establish a neutral criteria that will define developed and develop-
ing countries. Second, the WTO should establish a new middle
category for emerging economies such as China; members of this
category would meet higher standards than traditional developing
countries, but lower standards than truly developed countries.
Third, the WTO should establish a system of review and gradua-
tion to evaluate every member periodically, thereby determining
whether economic conditions have changed such that the member
should be moved to a new category.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
A. GATT Principles
The GATT agreement reflected principles viewed as critical to
the rebuilding of the world economy in the aftermath of World
War II. First, free trade was seen as a mechanism to create eco-
nomic growth and to avoid another depression.32 Second, chang-
30. See infra Part III.A.1.
31. See infra Part III.A.2.; WTO Membership, supra note 14. In addition to China,
the following nations have applied for WTO membership: Albania, Algeria, Armenia,
Belarus, Cambodia, Chinese Taipei, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kirgyz
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Nepal,
Panama, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sudan, Sultanate of Oman, Tonga,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. See id.
32. See The Foundations of the World Trading System, supra note 9.
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ing notions of sovereign equality led to a belief that countries at
different economic, social and political levels should be given
different responsibilities in the world 3 Third, the ideology of
development made the development of the underdeveloped world
a top international priority."
The GAT agreement fosters free trade through specific re-
quirements and programs. The GATT requires that all members
apply the principle of most-favored nation (MFN) treatment to all
goods imported from other member countries, which means that
each member must grant the trade goods of other members treat-
ment no less favorable than that accorded to the trade goods of
any other country. 5 The MFN clause ensures that no country is
given any special trading advantage; similarly, it ensures that no
country is discriminated against. 6 Related to the MFN clause, the
principle of national treatment ensures that once goods have en-
tered a market, they are treated no less favorably than the equiva-
lent domestically produced goods.37 Next, the GATT has fostered
free trade through a series of negotiated rounds, in which the
contracting parties to the GATT have progressively decreased
their tariff barriers, helping to fuel an incredible expansion in
global trading. 8 The progressive lowering of tariffs, and the exis-
tence of a series of rules governing their use, has led to more pre-
dictability in international trade, and has increased market access
33. See ABDULQAWI YUSUF, LEGAL ASPECrS OF TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVEL-
OPING STATES: A STUDY IN THE INFLUENCE OF DEVELOPMENT NEEDS ON THE Evo-
LUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 (1982).
34. See U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
35. See The Foundations of the World Trading System, supra note 9; see also GATT
art. I (MEFN clause).
36. See The Foundations of the World Trading System, supra note 9.
37. See id.; GATr, supra note 7, art. 3.
38. See The Foundations of the World Trading System, supra note 9. In addition,
Former Trade Representative Carla Hills recently argued: "[L]t is absolutely demonstrable
that the explosion of trade over the past four decades has lifted more people out of pov-
erty than ever before in world history.... Even a little bit of association with foreign
markets provides these benefits." National Press Club Morning Newsmaker with Former
U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills; Topic: World Trade Organization Ministerial Confer-
ence in Singapore, Fed. News Serv., Dec. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Fednew File. Hills concluded that "[wle have enjoyed four decades of unparalleled
growth in this nation's history. And that is in large measure because trade has been
open." Id.
15251997]
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for many products.39 Finally, the GATT has promoted fair and
undistorted competition.'
The first principle reflected in the GATT, changing notions of
sovereign equality, led to a shift "from abstract and general norms
of conduct which apply equally to all in spite of the differences in
wealth and development, to purpose-oriented rules which take into
account the concrete characteristics of the various members of the
international community."'" The new international institutions
created at this time, including the United Nations, the Internation-
al Monetary Fund, and the GAIT, were established to address
issues of international peace and security" and took into account
the differences among nations.43 The notion of differential rights
and responsibilities under the GAT agreement is a product of
this change in belief; international legal institutions moved from a
notion that all nations were equal to a set of beliefs that focused
on the differences between states and the need to take positive ac-
tion to help those states at the bottom.'
39. See The Foundations of the World Trading System, supra note 9.
40. See id.
41. YusuF, supra note 33, at 27; see also Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in
the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL U. L. Rnv. 347, 356-68 (1994) (describing the
many departures from a free trade system for developing countries, including non-recipro-
cal tariff preferences and duty-free treatment).
42. See YusuF, supra note 33, at 24.
43. See id. at 26-27.
44. See id. at 36; cf. Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in
Latin America: Towards a Communal Model of Development in a Neoliberal World, 30
STAN. J. INT'L L. 221, 227 (1994) (arguing that the state has a duty to ensure that "vul-
nerable groups" participate in the efficient economy); Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall
Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in Devel-
oping Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 605-10 (1996) (proposing mechanisms that western investors should
follow to help, rather than destabilize, developing countries). Developing countries used
the United Nations and other international institutions as a forum to call for the adop-
tion of an international legal principle that would recognize "the inappropriateness of the
application of equal treatment and reciprocity among unequally developed countries."
YusuF, supra note 33, at 36. This led to the belief that there is a "right to differential
treatment based, not on the market equivalence of transactions, but on the capability of
the underdeveloped partner." 1d, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
in Article 19, states:
With a view to accelerating the economic growth of developing countries and
bridging the economic gap between developed and developing countries, devel-
oped countries should grant generalized preferential, non-reciprocal and non-dis-
criminatory treatment to developing countries in those fields of international
economic co-operation where it may be feasible.
G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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In addition to changing notions of equality, international law
was affected by the ideology of development, a belief that devel-
oping the underdeveloped world was the key to peace and justice
throughout the world.45 The most important role of international
institutions, other than avoiding war, was to foster a "more rapid
industrial and agricultural development of the economically under-
developed three-quarters of the globe."' With these new interna-
tional institutions, economic isolationism declined as a phenome-
non, as international law began to focus on the economic integra-
tion of states.4 7 This new ideology was best exemplified by the
United Nations Charter, which called for "the promotion of higher
standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic
and social progress and development."
These ideological principles gave the GAT two major, and
possibly conflicting, goals: 1) to promote free trade; and 2) to pro-
tect and help developing countries. Often, the mechanisms needed
to protect developing countries conflicted with the goal of free
trade because developing countries were exempt from many of the
GATT requirements designed to foster free trade. With this ideo-
logical background, and with these principles in mind, a pressing
issue is how to strike the balance between promoting free trade
and protecting and helping developing countries.
B. The GATT and Developing Countries
When the original GATT was enacted, developing countries
sought exemptions from the commitments made by the major
developed countries. 4 During the 1950s and 1960s, developing
countries lobbied to gain preferential access to developed
countries' markets by paying lower tariffs on their export goods."
45. See YusuF, supra note 33, at xvi-xvii.
46. Stanley D. Metzger, PaneL Tariff Preferences and Developing Countries, 60 PROC.
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 84, 84 (1966) (introductory remarks).
47. See YuSUF, supra note 33, at 26.
48. U.N. CHARTER art. 55. As noted in Article 9 of the U.N. Declaration on Social
Progress and Development: "Social progress and development are the common concerns
of the international community, which shall supplement, by concerted international action,
national efforts to raise the living standards of peoples . . . . " G.A. Res. 2542, U.N.
GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 50, U.N. Doc. An630 (1969).
49. DIANA TUSSLE, THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: A CHALLENGE TO THE GATT 137 (1987).
50. See id.
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Developing countries also sought the ability to protect their own
internal market by levying higher tariffs on imports, by subsidizing
their own industries, and by employing other emergency measures
as necessary to protect their own infant industries.5 The GAT
agreement ultimately embodied the objectives of the developing
countries.52 It reflected the notion that developing countries
should be afforded more protection than developed countries.53
For example, developing countries were allowed to take protective
action to "raise the general standard of living of their people."'54
In addition, developing countries were allowed to grant tariff pro-
tection to protect specific domestic industries from competition, or
to limit outright the amount of imports that could come into the
country.55
In 1971, negotiations sponsored under the GATT set up the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which allows developed
countries to set tariffs on the importation of certain products from
developing countries at a tariff rate of zero.56 The GATT GSP
provision allowed "developed contracting parties .. . to accord
preferential tariff treatment to products originating in developing
countries ... with a view to extending to such countries... gen-
erally the preferential tariff... without according such treatment
to like products of other contracting parties., 57 Thus, developed
countries are allowed to give a better tariff rate to developing
51. See iat
52. See id. at 137-38.
53. See GAIT, supra note 7, art. 36. The GATT agreement states the general princi-
pie that less-developed contracting parties have special needs and that developmental
goals must be recognized. See id. In fact, there is an explicit understanding that devel-
oping countries may "use special measures to promote their trade and development." Id.;
see also GATT, supra note 7, art. 37 (stating the general notion that developed contract-
ing parties have certain obligations to less-developed contracting parties to ensure that
their economies are not hurt by developed countries' trading practices). Article 37 also
sets up obligations to affirmatively act to help improve the economic situation of tile
developing contracting parties' economies. See id.; see also GAT, supra note 7, art. 38
(calling on developed countries to "collaborate in seeking feasible methods to expand
trade for the purpose of economic development"). Developed countries are supposed to
"keep under continuous review the development of world trade with special reference to
the rate of growth of the trade of less-developed contracting parties." Id.
54. GATT, supra note 7, art. 18.
55. See id.
56. See GATT Decision Establishing the Generalized System of Preferences, June 25,
1971, GAIT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24 (1972) [hereinafter GAT Decision].
57. Id.
1528 [Vol. 46:1519
1997] EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE WTO 1529
countries than their MFN tariff, which normally should be the
lowest tariff given5 8
Zero tariff treatment under the GATT is extremely valuable.
The GATT gives discretion to individual developed countries to
determine how they will administer their GSP program so long as
they notify the other contracting parties of their rules.59 This dis-
cretion allows the developed countries to determine which coun-
tries are eligible, and what specific products can gain the preferen-
tial zero tariff rate.'
C. The WTO and Developing Countries6'
Today, the original GATT agreement has been incorporated
into the WTO agreement.' In addition, the WTO agreement
incorporated a number of agreements designed to further liberalize
trade among its members.'
The various WTO agreements use several methods to provide
special benefits to developing countries.' Some provisions, which
58. See JACKSON Er AL, supra note 8, at 443-54. Under GATT, and now under the
WTO, member countries negotiate a series of multilateral commitments in setting the
tariff schedule on numerous products from all members. See id. As a requirement of the
GATr/WTO, member countries must promise that the lowest tariff that they give to any
one country is given to all members. See id. Thus, the United States, for example, gives
its MFN tariff rate to all members of the WTO, and to other countries, such as China,
by separate agreement. The United States only uses its non-MFN tariff for such outlaw
states as Libya and North Korea.
59. See GAIT Decision, supra note 56, at 25.
60. See id.
61. Part I.C describes the six most important parts of the WTO agreement that offer
special advantages to developing country members. However, numerous other provisions
in the WTO Agreement give special benefits to developing countries. See, eg., Agree-
ment on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 13, Annex 1A, reprint-
ed in FINAL ACT, supra note 13, at 43; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 13, Annex 1A,
reprinted in FINAL Acr, supra note 13, at 69; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
Apr. 15, 1994, WITO Agreement, supra note 13, Annex 1A, reprinted in FINAL ACT,
supra note 13, at 117; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 13,
Annex 1A, reprinted in FINAL ACT, supra note 13, at 145 (governing the ability to apply
anti-dumping duties against other members); Agreement on Implementation of Article
VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 13, Annex 1A, reprinted in FINAL ACT, supra note 13, at 171 (dealing
with issues of determining customs valuation).
62. See A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 14.
63. See id.
64. See Committee on Trade and Dev., A Description of the Provisions Relating to
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are aspirational in nature, recognize the interests of developing
countries, but do not create any concrete legal responsibilities.
Others provide important legal norms, such as requiring develop-
ing countries to meet fewer obligations than developed countries,
thus allowing developing countries to protect their local industries
far more than developed countries are allowed to do.66 Similarly,
some WTO provisions allow developing countries longer time peri-
ods to implement certain obligations.67 Finally, still other provi-
sions, which again are more aspirational and do not create en-
forceable legal obligations, provide for formal technical assistance
from developed countries to developing countries.' The following
discussion illustrates the substantive impact of applying the above
methods to specific agreements within the Wro that grant various
forms of preferences to developing countries.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures.69 The
purpose of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMs) within the WTO treaty is to prevent non-tariff related
barriers to trade."0 Countries use non-tariff barriers, or TRIMs, to
protect their markets by limiting the freedom of foreigners to
negotiate with willing parties in the country.7 For example, laws
known as domestic local content requirement laws require
enterprises located within the country to purchase certain amounts
of locally produced goods.72 Under the WTO's TRIMs agree-
ment, such local content requirements are impermissible TRIMs
because they restrict and distort trade by limiting the freedom of
the foreign party to find the best and cheapest products.73
Developing and developed countries are treated differently
under the TRIMs agreement, which takes into account "the partic-
Developing Countries in the Uruguay Round Agreements, Legal Instruments and Ministerial
Decisions, COM.TD/W/510 (Nov. 2, 1994), at 5.
65. See id
66. See id
67. See id
68. See id
69. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 13, Annex 1A, reprinted in FINAL ACr, supra note 13, at 139 [hereinaf-
ter TRIMs Agreement].
70. See A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 14.
71. See id
72. See id
73. See id Other impermissible TRIMs include trade balancing requirements that
restrict the volume or value of imports foreign enterprises may purchase or use. See id.
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ular trade, development and financial needs of developing country
Members." 4 The real benefit to developing countries is that
while developed countries must eliminate all TRIMs within 2 years
after the WTO goes into force, developing country members have
five years to come into compliance.75 Even after five years, when
developing country members technically must be in compliance
with the agreement, they are given the power to "deviate tempo-
rarily from the provisions." 76
2. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
77
The WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
requires members to eliminate most government subsidies to ind-
ustry.78 Subsidies have a protective and anti-competitive effect
that is antithetical to the promotion of free trade. At the same
time, the WTO agreement recognizes "that subsidies may play an
important role in economic development programmes of develop-
ing country Members."79 It allows developing countries to con-
tinue subsidies for up to eight years, and, even after the end of
the phase-in period, to have subsidies, albeit those that have a
smaller impact than before."0
3. Agreement on Safeguards.8' The purpose of the Agree-
ment on Safeguards is to allow all member states to use temp-
orary and limited safeguards to protect a specific domestic industry
from "an unforeseen increase of imports" of any product likely to
74. TRIMs Agreement, supra note 69 (preamble). This is an example of a provision
that recognizes the interests of developing countries.
75. See id. art. 5(2). This is an example of a provision that grants a longer time-
frame for implementation.
76. See id. art. 4. This is an example of a provision that allows developing countries
to meet fewer obligations than developed countries because developed countries have no
right to ever deviate from those provisions.
77. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, supra note 13, Annex 1A, reprinted in FINAL Acr, supra note 13, at 229
[hereinafter Subsidies Agreement].
78. See id. art. 3; A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 14.
79. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 77, art. 27(1). This is a provision that recognizes
the interests of developing country members.
80. See id. art. 27(3)-(4); A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra
note 14.
81. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 13, An-
nex 1A, reprinted in FINAL Acr, supra note 13, at 273 [hereinafter Safeguards Agree-
ment].
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cause "serious injury to the industry."'  Safeguards refer to a
number of mechanisms a country may use to protect local indus-
tries from destructive foreign competition.' The agreement tight-
ens the requirements for when safeguards are appropriate, and
limits their duration.' Again, members deemed "developing
countries" get special advantages. For example, developing coun-
tries may impose a safeguard for up to two years to protect their
own industries,' whereas developed countries may not impose a
safeguard measure against products that originate in developing
countries unless very stringent requirements are met, and even
then the developed country may only impose the safeguard for a
maximum of 200 days.86
4. General Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights.87 The General Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) has increased the
international protection of intellectual property.88 The agreement
requires WTO members to treat foreign holders of intellectual
property rights no less favorably than they treat domestic holders
of intellectual property rights.8 9 In addition, members agree to
comply with many of the substantive provisions of the Berne Con-
vention for the protection of literary and artistic works, and of the
Paris Convention on patents.' As with other parts of the WTO
agreement, this agreement confers a significant benefit on develop-
ing countries: Developing countries have four years before they
must implement the agreement.91
82. A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 14.
83. See JACKSON ET AL, supra note 8, at 609-12.
84. See id.; A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 14.
85. See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 81, art. 9(1). This is a provision that
allows developing countries to meet fewer obligations.
86. See id. arts. 6, 9(2).
87. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 13, Annex 1C, reprinted in FINAL Acr, supra note
13, at 319 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
88. See A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 14.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 87, art. 65(2). This provision provides devel-
oping countries with a longer time-frame for implementation of the agreement. Develop-
ing countries also have an additional five years before they must implement the rules on
patents. See id. art. 65(4).
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5. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.92 The
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures increases transparency
and predictability9 3 by requiring countries to publish sufficient in-
formation so that foreign traders will be able to know the basis on
which import licenses are granted. It also requires that traders be
notified about any changes in a country's import licensing
procedures.94 Transparency is important because if the rules are
not clearly stated and available, foreign traders would be at a seri-
ous disadvantage because they would not know how to comply
with local rules, and therefore might not be able to secure a
license.
Again, developing countries receive special treatment. The
agreement takes "into account the particular trade, development
and financial needs of developing country Members." 95 Develop-
ing countries are not required to incur additional "administrative
and financial burdens" to comply with the enhanced disclosure
requirements. 6 At the same time, developed countries are ex-
pected to give special attention to developing countries when
issuing scarce licenses for entry of goods into their countries. 9 7
6. General Agreement on Trade in Services.98 The General
Agreement on Trade in Services attempts to remove or reduce
barriers to the introduction of services from one country into
another country.99 The agreement essentially requires a most-
favored nation approach, and requires transparency through the
publication of all relevant laws and regulations.'00 The agreement
92. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
supra note 13, Annex 1A, reprinted in FINAL Acr, supra note 13, at 221 [hereinafter
Licensing Agreement].
93. See id. (preamble).
94. See A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 14.
95. Licensing Agreement, supra note 92 (preamble). This provision recognizes the
interests of developing countries.
96. Id. art. 3(5)(a)(iv). This provision allows developing countries to meet fewer obli-
gations than developed countries if it is too expensive for them to comply.
97. See id. art. 3(5)(J). This provision recognizes the special needs of developing
countries.
98. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra
note 13, Annex 1B, reprinted in FINAL Acr, supra note 13, at 283 [hereinafter Services
Agreement].
99. See A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 14.
100. See id.
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attempts to open up as many service sectors as possible to
competition from foreign service providers.''
As with other agreements, the General Agreement on Trade
in Services has specific special provisions designed to help devel-
oping countries." Developed countries are urged to recognize
the "needs of... developing country Members, for flexibility in
this area."'"13 Developing countries are also not required to open
as many service sectors to competition as developed countries
must open.'4
II. CHINA AND THE PROBLEM OF LACK OF DEFINITION
A. The Current Dispute Between China and the United States
Although China faces many hurdles in its effort to gain ad-
mission to the WTO, one of the most important is the continuing
controversy over China's status as a developed or developing
country." China submitted an application to become a founding
member of the WTO on January 1, 1995, but only as a developing
country."° The United States and other western industrialized
countries prevented China from becoming a member at that
time,"° chiefly because these countries disputed the claim that
China qualified as a developing country." The United States
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Services Agreement, supra note 98, art. XV(1). This provision recognizes the
special needs of developing countries.
104. See id. art. XIX(2). This provision requires developing countries to meet fewer
obligations than developed countries. The Services Agreement also calls on developed
countries to provide technical assistance to developing countries. See id. art. XXV(2).
105. See China Researchers Dispute US Denial of Containment Policy (China Radio
International broadcast, Aug. 5, 1995), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
Another major stumbling block is human rights. See id. While the United States has at-
tempted to use trade negotiations as a lever to improve the human rights situation in
China, China claims that such pressure constitutes unjustifiable meddling in its internal
affairs. See How US, Japan Can Help Integrate China into the World Community,
STRArrS TME (Singapore), Nov. 20, 1996, at 34, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Curnws File (reporting text of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore's speech at
the Create 21 Asahi Symposium in Osaka, Japan) (noting that China "resents and resists
[the U.S.'s attempts to make China more democratic] as an interference in its domestic
matters"). However, a discussion of human rights issues is outside the scope of this Note.
106. See Parker, supra note 2.
107. See id.
108. See id.; Testimony of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Ways and Means Comm., Fed. Document Clearing House, Sept. 19,
1996, available in 1996 WL 10831126. The United States, through the GATr Working
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has been adamant that China enter the WTO as a developed
country because if China were to enter the WTO as a developing
country, it would be allowed to maintain most of the market-re-
stricting and protectionist barriers that currently limit the ability of
foreign companies to export their goods to China."°
While leaders in the United States have called China a devel-
oped country, numerous important political leaders and institutions
within China have stated unequivocally that China will not join
the WTO unless it is admitted as a developing country. Chinese
Foreign Trade Minister Wu Yi has said that China is willing to
negotiate and compromise on the issues regarding the alignment
of China's economy with international trade standards, but China
will not compromise on its demand to come into the WTO as a
developing nation."' Chinese state radio has commented that the
United States' position places "excessive and unrealistic demands,
which have led to the failure of China's GATT membership nego-
tiations at the end of last year.""' The Chinese Ministry of For-
eign Trade and Economic Cooperation has claimed that "the main
obstacle to China's reentry into GATI is the excessive demands
raised by a few countries which exceed the level of China's eco-
nomic development."1
2
Party on China's accession, has isolated five major issues that China must address before
it can be admitted to the GATI': 1) The scope and nature of China's non-tariff import
protection; 2) the role of foreign trade corporations and other large state trading entities;
3) China's claim that agriculture should be exempt because China is a developing nation;
4) the scope and direction of China's price planning;, and 5) foreign exchange restrictions
that might be used to frustrate GAIT requirements. See id. In arguing against the cate-
gorization of China as a "developing country," Peter D. Sutherland, Director-General of
the GATI, put special emphasis on the fact that China moved from 31st in the world in
merchandise trade, in 1980, to 11th place in the space of thirteen years, accounting for
3% of all world merchandise trade. See Global Multilateral Trading System." The Role of
the PRC, GATr Doc. 1633, at 4 (May 11, 1994). Sutherland also pointed out that there
are still numerous obstacles to China's admission, including the lack of transparency of
China's market, the role of state-trading enterprises and the uniform administration of
their trade regime. See id. Sutherland focused on China's need to "take these concerns
seriously." Id.
109. See 1996 National Trade Estimate: China, People's Republic of (visited Mar. 7,
1997) <httpl/www.ustr.govlreportslnte/1996/china.html>; see also supra Part I.B. (describing
permissive treatment of developing countries under the GATr).
110. See Parker, supra note 2. Wu stated that "[w]e must adhere to our principle and
will not beg anybody and will never sell out our principles." Id. Wu blames the failure
of negotiations thus far on the United States' placing "excessive demands . . . on China."
Id.
111. China Researchers Dispute US Denial of Containment Policy, supra note 105.
112. Taiwan, USA, Trade Issues, New China News Agency Domestic Serv., July 31,
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The United States continues to use its power in the WTO to
block China's admission to the WTO; its position is that because
China is one of the world's biggest trading nations, it should be
considered a developed economy.13 Mickey Kantor, former U.S.
Trade Representative, argues that, "we all agree that for certain
purposes, China, of course, is a developed country."'"4  One
American trade official noted that, "overall, as a trade regime, we
are dealing with an enormously important, enormously large, pow-
erful player."" The United States does not want to give China
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File; see also WTO Admission,
Zhongguo Tongxun She News Agency, July 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BBCSWB File (reporting on China's active and realistic attitude towards re-entering
GATr despite its unwillingness to accept unreasonable conditions); Talks Resumed in
Geneva on China Rejoining GATT, New China News Agency, May 11, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File (stating that China is taking a strong stance on its
re-entry to GATT, and is requesting a realistic approach by major contracting parties).
Other Chinese officials have also emphasized the importance of China's status as a devel-
oping country and criticized the American stance. See, e.g., US and Chinese Presidents to
Continue "Strategic" Dialogues, Look to Future, Xinhua News Agency, Nov. 25, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB file (noting that President Jiang Zemin
recently referred to China as "the world's largest developing country"); Ruth Young-
blood, China Issues Warning Over WTO Admission, UPI, May 13, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (Vice Premier Li Linqing warned that "China will not
jeopardize its national interest to enter the WTO"); Talks Resumed on China's Rejoining
GATT, Xinhua News Agency, May 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Non-US
File ("China has been calling for a realistic stand by major contracting parties on its ad-
mission into GATT/WTO as a developing country, with full consideration of its still weak
economic basis despite its strong economic growth over past years."); China Maintains
Hard-Line on WTO Status, Agence France Presse, May 3, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Curnws File (Zhu Qizhen, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Parliament's
Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that China could "only embrace the obligations of
membership as a developing nation").
The United States is quite adamant that China come into the WTO as a developed
country which has been highly criticized by China as being "hard." See Beijing Praises
EU's China Policy, Slams "Hard" US Stance, Agence France Presse, July 16, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. The United States is continuing to hold up
China's admission to the WTO on the demand that China enter as a developed country.
See Youngblood, supra.
113. See Gattsmacked, ECONOMIST, Mar. 18, 1995, at 16.
114. Rone Tempest, U.S. Will Back China's Bid to Join WTO, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,
1995, at D2.
115. Id The United States' trade deficit with China is the primary evidence American
officials use to justify their claims that China needs to make further concessions before
admission to the WTO. See Special Report: Trade Outlook for 1995, 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 129, 143 (Jan. 18, 1995). In 1996, the trade deficit with China was $39.5 billion,
an increase of $5.7 billion from 1995. See OFFIcE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
FOREIGN TRADE BARRmERS 43 (1997) [hereinafter FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS].
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an economic advantage by allowing it to enter the WTO as a
developing country."6 To do so would allow Chinese companies
to conform to less rigorous standards than American companies in
similar areas, making it far more difficult for American businesses
to succeed in China."7
Both the United States and China seemed inflexible in their
demands until recently, when relations between China and the
United States generally have improved. President Clinton has soft-
ened the rhetoric of his first campaign and early years in the
White House about China."' This softened rhetoric includes a
less harsh stance in the United States' position against China's
admission to the WTO." It is not clear, however, how far the
United States will go."m At a minimum, President Clinton has
stated that the United States will not support China's bid to join
the WTO until it does more to open its markets." Opening
Li Tieying, CCP Central Committee Political Bureau Member, responded to U.S.
economic statistics by pointing out that
China is a developing country with an average per capita GNP of only about
400 US dollars and more than 80 million people who are still living in pover-
ty .... It is unfair and unacceptable to treat China as if it were a developed
or semi-developed country and require it to shoulder international obligations
which do not conform with its development level and its national rights.
China and the World, Li Tieying Addresses "The World Economy and China" Conference,
China News Agency Domestic Serv., Apr. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BBCSWB File.
116. See infra Part II.B.
117. See id.
118. See Chinese Foreign Minister Holds News Conference on APEC, Xinhua News
Agency, Nov. 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File. As a result of
a meeting between President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin at the APEC Summit,
the two countries agreed to the following- 1) to have two official state visits by both
heads of state in 1997 and 1998; 2) to speed up negotiations on China's accession to the
WTO; and 3) to discuss a number of critical international issues such as global security,
regional concerns and nuclear proliferation. See id; see also Pragmatic and Proper Line
in U.S. Relations with China; Clinton Gives Trade and Long-Term Influence Priority, L.A.
TMS, Nov. 26, 1996, at B6 (noting that human rights issues are now behind trade and
security issues on the United States' agenda with China).
119. See Edward Luce & Guy de Jonquie'res, Confusion Greets Clinton's Big Deal,
FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1996, at 6. President Clinton told President Zemin that the US
would be "flexible and pragmatic" in the WTO negotiations provided that China pledged
to open its markets further and embrace WTO rules. See id. Senator Sam Nunn has
argued that "[t]he United States should seek to work constructively with China to facili-
tate its entry ... into the international regimes that regulate and order world affairs."
Sam Nunn & Michael Oksenberg, The U.S. Needs China--and Vice Versa, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 26, 1996, at A33.
120. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 108. U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky has also not-
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markets, however, does not necessarily mean that China must
meet the same standards as would be required of a fully devel-
oped country."
In response to changes in the United States's position, China
has been sending mixed signals as to how willing it will be to
open its market to foreign trade." At the recent APEC summit,
President Jiang Zemin expressed a desire to be flexible in address-
ing China's admission to the WTO. 24 He highlighted China's re-
ed that China must improve its "open market policy" before it could join the WTO.
U.S., China at Odds Over WTO Membership, Japan Econ. Newswire, Nov. 21, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File.
122. See Michael Richardson, Pacific Talks End in Push for Free Trade in Technology,
INT'L HERALD TRB., Nov. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File; see
also U.S. Offers 'Road Map' to China's Entry into WTO, ASIAN ECON. NEWS, Nov. 13,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File (discussing the flexible road map
offered by the U.S. for China's transition into the WTO). The United States promised to
be more "flexible" about the developing country issue, but remained firm in its demand
that China at some point accept strict requirements, and not the general requirements for
developing countries. See id. The United States has signalled a willingness to compromise
as to whether China should be allowed some transition period before the most stringent
obligations are required. See id. Former Trade Representative and Commerce Secretary
Mickey Kantor conceded that for some purposes, China is "a developing country." Tem-
pest, supra note 114, at D2. United States trade officials have agreed that a compromise
could be reached where "China will be granted extra time ... before it will be required
to phase out certain tariffs and protective trade restrictions." Id.; see also Jurek Martin,
Differences Treated with Respect, FIN. TIpms, Nov. 22, 1996, at 18 (stating that developing
China into a fully fledged market economy could necessitate important social, political
and economic change).
123. See China Stresses Cooperation over Liberalisation in Asia-Pacific, Agence France
Presse, Nov. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File. The Chinese Com-
munist Party's mouthpiece, The People's Daily, argued that China would not make con-
cessions in trade liberalization without "deeper technological cooperation." Id.
124. See US and Chinese Presidents To Continue "Strategic" Dialogues, Look to Fu-
ture, supra note 112; see also Chinese Foreign Minister Praises Jiang-Clinton Talks at
APEC, Xinhua News Agency, Nov. 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BBCSWB File (reporting a statement by Chinese Vice-Premier Qian Qichen regarding
U.S. and Chinese disagreement concerning the requirements for China's accession to the
WTO, in which he said that he felt that "[w]e have differences. However, we can solve
these differences through negotiations and consultations"). Prior to the APEC meeting,
Japan and Australia announced support for China's WTO membership. See Japan, Austra-
lia Agree to Back China's WTO Bid, Japan Econ. Newswire, Nov. 21, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. This leaves the United States as the principle road-
block in the path toward China's admission to the WTO. See id There also seems to be
a growing international consensus in favor of China's admission to the WTO, which was
recently expressed at the 1996 APEC Minsters meeting in Manila. See Stanislav Bychkov,
APEC Favors China's, Taiwan's Admission to WTO, The Russian Info. Agency ITAR-
TASS, Nov. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. Senior officials of
all 18 members of APEC "unanimously agreed to support the applications of Beijing and
Taipei for WTO membership." Id. Major European nations also support China's admis-
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cent reduction in import tariff rates from an average of 35.9% to
an average of 23%, and committed China to a reduction to an
average of 15% by year 2000."z He indicated a desire to accel-
erate the negotiation process.' 26 Other sources indicate that Chi-
na also may be willing to agree to make a "down payment" on its
WTO application by accepting some of the stricter commitments
required for developed countries by the WTO immediately, and
phasing in others over time."2 7
sion to the WTO, and the Foreign Trade Association, which represents the importing
retail trade in Europe, has been lobbying for such support. See FTA Welcomes Brittan's
Statement on China's Accession to WTO, reprinted in REUTER EUR. COMMUNIrY REP.,
Nov. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
125. See Chinese President's APEC Address, Xinhua News Agency, Nov. 25, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File. China has also proposed to cut tariffs
further to an average of 15% by the year 2000. See Ray Heath, Steady Convergence to
Free Trade, SOUTH CHINA MORNING PosT, Nov. 17, 1996, at 5, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Curnws File. Of course, tariff reduction may not mean that China's mar-
ket will be any more open to foreign trade because of other state interventions inherent
in a planned economy. See infra Part II.B. The current reduction to 24% only applies to
4000 items. See Heath, supra. In addition, the lower tariffs were not in key sectors, such
as the automobile industry, where there is great interest in exports by Europe and the
U.S.; instead the lower tariffs were in sectors such as raw materials which are of less
interest to western exporters. See Sophie Roell, China Offers to Cut Tariffs to 15%, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1996, at 6. Myriad other restrictions, such as quotas and licensing re-
quirements, also hurt western exports. See id.
126. President Clinton is also in a strong position to make unpopular decisions domes-
tically, such as accelerating China's entry into the WTO, because of his reelection victory,
and the fact that he cannot run again for office. See Leon Hadar, American Trade Lead-
ership Needed, Bus. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, at 4. Former Secretary of State Warren Chris-
topher stated that "[a]dmitting China to the World Trade Organization conforms to the
interests of the United States, which is willing to speed up negotiations with China."
President Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng in Talks with U.S. Secretary of State, Xinhua
News Agency, Nov. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File. Howev-
er, there is still disagreement between China and the U.S. over China's WTO bid. See
U.S., China at Odds Over WTO Membership, supra note 121.
127. See China Warms to WTO Down-Payment Deal, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 16, 1996, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File (statement of Euro-
pean Commission vice president, Sir Leon Brittan). Brittan believes that China may be
moving toward accepting the compromise supported by the EU to allow for China's
admission to the WTO. See EU Announces Breakthrough in Talks on China's WTO Bid,
Agence France Presse, Nov. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
The question now becomes whether the United States would accept such a compromise.
See id. C. Fred Bergsten, director of the Institute for International Economics, argues
that "there is still a big debate about this in Beijing, which is why I'm not very optimis-
tic about an agreement anytime soon." Steven Pearlstein, Both Sides Lack Consensus:
Beijing Says US to Speed Talks on Bid to Join WTO, INT'L HERALD TRm., Nov. 26,
1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. Nicholas Lardy, an Asia expert at
the Brookings Institute, argues that the best the United States can hope for is that China
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The net result of these latest developments is that the United
States still will not allow China to join the WTO unless an agree-
ment regarding its admission contains "'commercially meaningful
terms.""' China continues to resist any limit on its ability to
use extra safeguards to secure sufficient protection for its domestic
industries." Reading between the lines, there does seem an abil-
ity to craft a compromise based upon the above terms, one that
does not involve the prior rigid formulation of both parties: that
is, one that does not require China to be treated as either an
entirely developed or entirely developing country.
Part of the difficulty in predicting the future of these negotia-
tions is the fact that China and the United States face divergent
domestic pressures. In the United States, businesses involved in
exporting products would like greater access to the Chinese mar-
ket and its approximately one billion potential consumers.'30 On
the other hand, U.S. industries that sell in the domestic market
fear that Chinese companies will use increased access to flood the
U.S. market, resulting in higher trade surpluses. 31 For China,
meeting the requirements for joining the WTO might cause short-
term dislocations, especially unemployment, as the inefficient state-
run enterprises are forced to compete without state subsidies."
will agree to make a small down payment toward opening its markets and reducing state
control of its economy, with a promise to complete its readjustment over 10-15 years.
See id. However, others argue that such a promise would be useless based upon China's
reluctance to abide by previous bilateral trade agreements on textiles and copyright laws.
See id.
128. Foo Choy Peng, U.S. Holds to Line on WTO: Applause for Beijing as Christo-
pher Offers Intensive Talks, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 22, 1996, at 4, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File (quoting former Secretary of State Warren Christo-
pher). Christopher also noted that there must be an agreement that calls for "effective
market access commitments and adherence to WTO rules." Id. However, he emphasized
that "[w]e can both profit by joining to establish and uphold the rules that open markets
and make trade more fair." Id.
129. See John D. Parsons, China's Re-Accession to the GATT and the Impact of the
Uruguay Round Agreement 1 HONG KONG L. SCH. REV. 46, 51-53 (1994).
130. See Pearlstein, supra note 127.
131. See id.
132. See id. After the recent APEC summit, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that
China hoped to finish talks to join the WTO by mid-1997. See China Hoping to Wind
Up WTO Talks with US by Mid-97, Agence France Presse, Nov. 25, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. However, there are mixed signals coming from
Beijing, as it appears that there is division within the Chinese government over how to
proceed with its accession to the WTO and with its relationship with the United States
in general. See Steven Mufson, China Sends Mixed Signals as Christopher Arrives, WASH.
POST, Nov. 20, 1996, at A21. The newspaper of the ruling Communist Party in China,
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It also, however, might provide China with a stable economic posi-
tion well into the next century.'33 Because both sides see value
in China's ultimate admission to the WTO, the countries have
agreed publicly to hold definitive talks in 1997 on China's acces-
sion to the WTO 4.' Many commentators believe that 1997 is the
critical year for these difficult issues to be resolved because of
President Clinton's reelection. 35
B. Problems if China is Admitted a as Developing Country
Absent requirements that China meet tougher standards than
those set for developing countries, China would not have to make
significant improvements in its trade policies even if it were in the
WTO. 36 Thus, while it is extremely important that China ulti-
The People's Daily, recently attacked the United States for its "xenophobia" and its "wild
arrogance and haughtiness." Id. To further cement its position as a world power, China
would like to join the WTO, but many within China worry that such a move would limit
China's ability to act in its self-interest. See id. Opponents of membership within China
point to the rapid growth China is experiencing as a non-member, and the incredible
demand of foreigners to do business in China. See id. China seeks prestige by joining the
WTO, but worries about the constraints of the multilateral arbitration procedures. See
Phasing Mainland Entry to WTO May Be the Key, SouTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov.
18, 1996, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File.
133. See Mure Dickie, China Says WTO Exclusion Unjus4 Warns U.S. on MFN,
REUTER EuR. Bus. REP., Nov. 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
134. See Timetable Set on Talks for China Joining WTO, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY,
Nov. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
135. See Lorien Holland, Sino-US Relations Have "Window of Opportunity," Agence
France Presse, Nov. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. David
Shambaugh, a political science and international relations professor at George Washington
University, argues that "[t]here is a real window of opportunity to establish good rela-
tions between China and the United States, because the anti-China lobby in the U.S. has
been effectively sidelined." Id. In a recent speech, Sir Leon Brittan argued that this is
the critical time to restart negotiations with China on its membership to the WO. See
Extracts of a Speech Given by Sir Leon Brittan-Trade, Economic Development and Sino-
European Relations-International Herald Tribune Conference, reprinted in COMM'N OF
THE EuR. COMMUNITIES RAPID, Nov. 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Curnws File. Brittan argued that the U.S. is ready to heed Europe's call for "decisive
engagement" on this issue. Id. Brittan also called for a flexible approach that would
allow China time before full implementation of WTO rules. See id.
136. See Kantor News Conference, supra note 29. Secretary Kantor noted that
America's trade deficit with China rose 14% from 1995-1996. See id. In September 1996,
the deficit with China was $4.7 billion, compared with a deficit of $3.8 billion with Japan.
See id. Secretary Kantor noted that the rate of increase in the deficit with China was
decreasing at a fairly impressive rate. That's due to a number of factors, not
the least of which is we've made some progress ... in opening up markets in
China. But we have a long way to go. We need to make sure the Chinese
government lives up to their obligations under our bilateral and trade agree-
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mately be admitted to the WTO, it must not be admitted as a de-
veloping country. China is a textbook example of a state that has
enabled its companies to do well in the global market while limit-
ing reciprocal access to its domestic market.37 China's economic
system is incompatible with the goals and policies of the
WTO.'38 China has policies that are inconsistent with the six
agreements discussed in Part I.C. It employs a wide range of for-
mal trade barriers that include tariffs, import licenses, and subsi-
dies. 3  In less obvious ways, China acts inconsistently with the
principles behind the WTO by promulgating state plans that "con-
trol decisions on issues such as plant location, foreign exchange
and application of regulations. ' 40 There is a lack of transparency
in nearly all aspects of Chinese regulations, hindering market ac-
cess.' 41 China is currently violating the standards set by the
WTO in six of the most important agreements as described in Part
I.C.: TRIMs, subsidies and countervailing measures, the Agree-
ment on Safeguards, TRIPs, Import Licensing, and Trade in Ser-
vices.
First, China currently employs certain Trade Related Invest-
ment Measures that limit foreign access to its domestic mar-
ket.4 - For example, China currently limits access to foreign ex-
change, effectively preventing investors from removing profits from
China in their own currency. Foreign investors are left with
ments, that they respond in a way that would be helpful in terms of the specif-
ic plans we're going to put on the table in the Philippines as a member of
APEC, and of course, that they ... advance a commercially reasonable pro-
gram to accede to the World Trade Organization.
Id.
137. See Greg Mastel, Earning WTO Admission, J. COM., Nov. 19, 1996, at 6A [here-
inafter Mastel, Earning WTO Admission], available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
138. Id.
139. See Greg Mastel, Beijing at Bay; China and International Trade, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Sept. 1996, at 26 [hereinafter Mastel, Beijing at Bay].
140. Id.
141. See 1996 National Trade Estimate: China, People's Republic of, supra note 109.
142. See Mastel, Earning WTO Admission, supra note 137, at 6A.
143. See Parsons, supra note 129, at 52. A panoply of regulations restrict the ability
of foreign investors in China to take profits out of the country in hard currency. Article
3 of the Provisional Regulation for Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic
of China states that China "pursues the policy of centralized control and unified man-
agement of foreign exchange by the state." Provision Regulations for Foreign Exchange
Control of the People's Republic of China, art. 3 (adopted Dec. 5, 1980, promulgated
Dec. 18, 1980), translated in 1 China L. for Foreign Bus. Reg. (CCH) 8-550. In 1983,
China set up detailed rules to implement the 1980 regulation. Article 16 requires foreign-
ers to get "the approval of competent authorities" before exchanging local for foreign
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profits in local Chinese currency, which is relatively worthless
because it is not freely convertible.'" In order for profits to be
remitted abroad, foreign investors need to obtain permission from
the State Administration of Exchange Controls (SAEC) and the
Bank of China (BOC).'4 s This administrative regime hinders for-
eign investment; further, it does not meet the strict requirements
against TRIMs set by the WTO. If admitted as a developing
country member, however, China would be permitted to continue
these practices.' 4
6
In addition, as a planned economy, it is very difficult to see
where the state ends, and private enterprise begins.47 The Chi-
nese government engages in extensive amounts of state planning
regarding economic decisions.'" The state plan determines the
amount of goods that China will purchase from abroad. For exam-
ple, China imposes outright import quotas on certain products that
are set by the state plan. 49 Such quotas restrict imports, in viola-
currency. See Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Regu-
lation Governing Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Investment, Foreign Enterprises with
Foreign Capital and Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures, art. 16, (approved July 19, 1983, pro-
mulgated Aug. 1, 1983), translated in 1 China L. for Foreign Bus. Reg. (CCH) 8-610.
144. See Parsons, supra note 129, at 52.
145. See Foreign Exchange Balancing, in CHINA INVESTMENT MANUAL 170, 180 (Don-
ald Lewis ed., 1994); see also Lucile A. Barole & Thomas E. Jones, Getting Strict with
Foreign Exchange, CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 52-53 (noting complicated proce-
dures for foreign companies to convert Chinese currency into hard currency).
146. See supra Part I.C.1.
147. See Government Structures, in CHINA TRADE AND MARKETING MANUAL 181, 182
(Donald Lewis ed., 1994).
148. See id. At the head of the government is the State Council, which is China's
highest executive and administrative organ. Under the State Council, the key governmen-
tal body that regulates trade is the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
(MOFTEC). MOFTEC works with the State Planning Commission (SPC), the Bank of
China (BOC), the State Administration of Exchange Control (SAEC), the Ministry of
Finance (MOF), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), and other
institutions to create the formal plans at the national level to set import and export re-
quirements. See id. The discussion in this section only deals with the myriad rules and
plans emanating from the central government. This, however, represents only a small part
of the story. At the local level, the local Commission on Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (COFTEC) replicates MOFTEC at the national level. See id at 182-85.
Each province and some large cities have their own COFTECs. In addition, there are
Provincial Planning Commissions (PPC), local Administration of Exchange Controls
(AEC), and local Administration for Industry and Commerce (AIC). These institutions
create an often overlapping and confusing set of regulations and state planning that all
foreigners must confront in order to do business in or with China. See id. at 185-87.
149. See 1996 National Trade Estimate: China, People's Republic of, supra note 109.
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tion of WTO norms." Central planning means that, even if
the WTO requires China to lower tariff rates, the market will not
be the factor that determines what goods China will purchase."1
Prices will have little effect on which goods are purchased because
supply and demand are determined by government agencies, and
not by market forces. Central planning, then, allows countries
like China to circumvent the market liberalization objectives of the
WTO. 153
A final impermissible TRIM is the restriction imposed by the
government on "the types and numbers of entities within China
which have the legal right to engage in international trade."" 4
The government restricts most foreign trade in China to that car-
ried out by Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs)."5 FTCs are
state-owned commercial entities that have the status of legal per-
sons under the law; each FTC deals within a narrowly-defined
business scope. 6 Foreign transactions can be consummated only
through approved FTCsY7
150. See id.
151. See Parsons, supra note 129, at 51. Parsons explains that
in market economies the reduction of import tariffs leads to lower prices and
increased competitiveness of the import goods. However, in a NME [non-market
economy] the reduction of tariffs will not have such a cause and effect relation-
ship. In market economies, relative prices guide export and import decisions of
private enterprises. In NMEs, price has little influence since supply and demand
are administratively determined. Tariffs which influence prices, likewise have
little influence over the quantity, source and composition of imports. The econo-
my runs according to the state plan.
Id, Thus, this state involvement is merely one subsidy that distorts the outcome of the
GATT.
152. See iL
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See Foreign Trade Corporations, in CHINA TRADE AND MARKETING MANUAL,
supra note 147, at 178.
156. See id. at 179. In fact, if FTCs deal in a commodity that is outside their business
scope, that is considered an ultra vires transaction and the contract is void. See id. Ex-
amples of FTCs include: China National Native Produce and Animal By-products Import
and Export Corporation, China National Light Industrial Products Import and Export
Corporation, China National Chemicals Import and Export Corporation, China National
Machinery Import and Expdrt Corporation, China National Silk Import and Export Cor-
poration, and China National Tobacco Import and Export Corporation. See Hong Kong
Trade Dev. Council, Major National Import and Export Corporations, in CHINA'S FOR-
EIGN TRADE SYSTEM app. 3 (1991). Thus, each of these FTCs can trade in the products
that are represented by. their name.
157. See Foreign Trade Corporations, supra note 155, at 179-80.
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The FTCs' monopoly on foreign trade transactions allows
them to exert a strong and wide-ranging influence. The FT7Cs have
created a standard form contract that cannot be modified by a for-
eign party and is quite one-sided.'58 For example, risk is shifted
to the foreign party,5 9 Chinese companies' liability is severely
limited, and a change in economic policy by the Chinese govern-
ment does not constitute a force majeure.'" The Chinese gov-
ernment controls the FTCs, controls the dispute resolution process,
and has the ability to change economic plans to the detriment of
the foreign party.'6'
A second WTO agreement that China violates is the limit on
government subsidies because the Chinese government gives direct
and indirect subsidies to industry."2 Direct subsidies include pay-
ments to exporters to make up for the lower world market price
for various goods,"a' allowing Chinese companies to export goods
at lower prices than they actually receive for them. The govern-
ment also gives many indirect subsidies to industry. Chinese enti-
ties receive low-priced energy and other raw materials; they also
receive bank loans on preferential terms.' 64 The above subsidies
violate the WTO because the Chinese government bears significant
aspects of the exporters' costs, making it easier for them to export
goods at a below-market price, and thus to underprice goods from
countries without similar subsidies.
158. See id. at 180.
159. See Standard Contract of Sales, in CHINA TRADE AND MARKETING MANUAL,
supra note 147, at 91, 91-94. One of the most unfair provisions in these standard sales
contracts, Section 7, regards the arbitration of trade disputes. See id. at 93. This section
calls for arbitration of trade disputes in "the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade," a governmental entity
directly responsible to the State Council. Id. This would be analogous to the following
situation: suppose Sony sells TVs to Circuit City and a trade dispute arises. If the Sony-
Circuit City sales contract contained a provision analogous to section seven of the stan-
dard Chinese sales contract, the dispute must be heard, not in a neutral court, but by
the U.S. Trade Representative, who is responsible to the President. To complete the
analogy, one must also consider that Circuit City would be a government enterprise,
under the control of the Executive Branch.
160. See Contracts-Foreign Related, in CHINA TRADE AND MARKETING MANUAL,
supra note 147, at 70. Force majeure clauses state that there are specific "problems be-
yond the reasonable control of the lessee that will excuse performance." BLAcK's LAW
DIcTIONARY 645 (6th ed. 1990). They are also referred to as "act of God" clauses. Id.
161. See Contracts-Foreign Related, supra note 160, at 70.
162. See 1996 National Trade Estimate: China, People's Republic of, supra note 109.
163. See id.
164. See id.
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Third, China is in violation of WTO norms on safeguards be-
cause its current tariff rates are especially high in certain key
industries." The government uses these high tariffs as part of a
national policy to protect certain sectors of the economy from
competition.'" In particularly important sectors, tariff rates on
goods are often 150%.167 Although average tariff rates are de-
clining, certain tariffs are significantly higher than that average.16
Further, the lack of transparency in China's tariff system 169
means that the same product may be assessed different tariff
rates. 70 Frequently, special exemptions from the published tariff
rates are available, but unknown to exporters.
Fourth, China is not in compliance with basic protection for
intellectual property required by the WTO.'7 ' Even after signing
the 1992 memorandum of understanding with the United States,
China has failed to enforce international intellectual property stan-
dards.' 72
Fifth, China is in violation of WTO norms regarding the need
for transparency and predictability in licenses. 73 The myriad im-
port licensing requirements have created "an effective import
barrier to the Chinese market."'74 No products may be imported
into China without a license, which must be issued by the govern-
ment. 75 Government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Trade
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See Geoffrey Crothall, Close All Pirate CD Factories, U.S. Insists, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, July 22, 1994, Business Section, at 1. For instance, in 1994, there were
26 CD plants in China which produced a total output of 75 million counterfeit compact
discs each year. See id. This has led to an investigation of China's intellectual property
practices pursuant to the U.S. Trade Act's Special 301 provision. See id. In 1992, the
U.S. Customs Service seized over $120 million in counterfeit goods coming from China.
See id.
Further, China has not improved access to its market for foreign audiovisual, sound
recording and software companies. See id.; see also FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, supra
note 115, at 43-44 (discussing Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China
on the Protection of Intellectual Property).
173. See 1996 National Trade Estimate: China People's Republic of, supra note 109.
174. Id.
175. See Import and Export Controls, China Bus. L. Guide (CCH Int'l) 80-252, at
82,201-82,501 (Sally A. Harpole ed., 1991).
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and Economic Cooperation (MOFIEC) have the power to issue
licenses for nearly 50% of all products that are imported into
China, giving the state tremendous power over which products
reach the Chinese marketplace.'76 The worst abuses occur when
a government ministry in charge of a Chinese manufacturer of a
particular product also oversees the import regulations imposed on
similar products produced abroad.'77
Sixth, China's closed market violates the requirements im-
posed by the General Agreement on Trade in Services.' 8 At
present, foreign service providers may only operate "under selec-
tive 'experimental' licenses and are restricted to specific geograph-
ic areas."'79 The rules regulating these experimental licenses are
not transparent, which leads to even more limits on market access
by foreigners."* Foreign service providers also are not offered
the same treatment as are Chinese nationals in that they have less
freedom to contract with customers than do Chinese entities.' 8'
Restrictions on foreign service providers have the effect of closing
off most of China's market to foreign competition."
Current Chinese practices, as outlined above, do not conform
to the WTO requirements for developed countries. If China were
admitted to the WTO as a developing country member, however,
it could continue its current practices."s China has indicated
through long years of practice that it will rise only to the mini-
mum level of economic reform mandated by outside pressure.' 4
Because developing countries are subject to less stringent require-
ments, China will have no incentive to ever liberalize its practic-
es.s Once China is a member of the WTO, the United States
will have lost the most significant leverage that it has
had-continued blocking of China's admittance to the WTO and
176. See 1996 National Trade Estimate: China, People's Republic of, supra note 109.
177. See id.
178. See Import and Export Controls, supra note 175, 80-252, at 82,204 (stating that
China has restricted the importation of consumer and luxury goods in order to protect
domestic industry).
179. 1996 National Trade Estimate: China, People's Republic of, supra note 109.
180. See hi.
181. See FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, supra note 115, at 53-55.
182. See id.
183. See supra Part I.C.
184. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
185. See Mastel, Beijing at Bay, supra note 139, at 26.
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the uncertainty of bilateral negotiations." s This leverage seems
to be effective: "China has suggested it would make no additional,
immediate reforms" once it joins the WTO.' Thus, it is impera-
tive that China's status be worked out prior to its admission.
C. Importance of China's Membership in the WTO
Despite China's non-compliance with WTO standards, it is
important for both economic and strategic reasons that China ulti-
mately be admitted and become integrated into the world
economy. China's admission to the WTO will make the WTO a
more effective international economic institution, increase econom-
ic activity and the peaceful resolution of trade disputes, and help
bring China more firmly into the family of nations, which may in
turn help to resolve other world problems.
China's admission will make the WTO a more effective inter-
national economic institution. China is an important economic
figure in the world; the WTO is incomplete without it as a mem-
ber." China is the eleventh largest exporter and importer in the
world, exporting $122 billion worth of products each year, and
importing $115.7 billion a year."8 Renato Ruggiero, Director-
General of the WTO, has said that "the global multilateral trading
system would be incomplete should China continue to be kept out
of WTO .... China, with its rapid economic growth and particu-
larly its great potential, would become one of the major forces
supporting [the] world's new trading order."'9
186. See id.
187. Id.
188. See Youngblood, supra note 112; see also Kwan Weng Kin, China in WTO Will
Play by Rules, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Nov. 20, 1996, at 16, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Curnws File (claiming that the United States is the country most capable
of integrating China into the world economy). Dr. Joseph Nye, Dean of the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, argues that casting China as the
enemy would create a "self-fulfilling prophecy." Id.
189. See WoRLD TRADE ORG., INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRENDS AND STATISTICS 75
(1995) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRENDS AND STATISTICS]. The 1994 figures
for Chinese exports showed a 32% increase from the prior year, and there was an 18%
increase between 1990-1994. See id. Imports increased 11% from the previous year, and
21% from 1990-1994. See id. For comparison, Japan exported $397 billion in 1994 and
imported $275 billion in 1994. See id. Only the United States, Germany, Japan, France,
the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, and Belgium ranked
ahead of China in the world. See id. at 13.
190. Ruggiero: Global Trading System Incomplete Without China, Xinhua News Agen-
cy, July 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File.
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Besides making the WTO a more effective economic institu-
tion, China's admission to the WTO will increase economic ac-
tivity in the world. If China further opened its economy, it would
be a huge export market for the rest of the world.'9' The Euro-
pean Commissioner for External Economic Affairs and Commer-
cial Policy, Leon Brittan, has said that "China's membership [is]
essential for the world economy."'192
If China is admitted to the WTO, the WTO will become a
better mechanism to resolve international trade disputes. A multi-
lateral forum can better address trade disputes with China than
the present ad-hoc bilateral negotiations that currently dominate
the U.S.-China trade regime. 93
Finally, China's admission to the WTO will help bring China
into the family of nations, thus decreasing tensions in many areas
around the globe. The United States and other nations should
enter a dialogue with China to ensure that its economy becomes
even more externally oriented and interdependent. This should
help to ensure future political stability in Asia.'94 Minister Lee
Kuan Yew of Singapore argues that, "[a]s China's economy be-
comes more externally orientated, it will become interdependent
with the major trading countries of the world."'" Such in-
terdependence, Yew believes, will make it "costly for China to
risk rupture of economic ties by violating accepted rules and con-
ventions. This can be a powerful factor to keep it engaged in the
international community."'96  Future economic cooperation be-
191. See Youngblood, supra note 112. Thus, Vice Premier Lanqing Li of China has
said that China's admission to the WTO will lead to "[a] more open China [that] will
provide the world economy with a huge market, more employment and better chances
for international allocation of resources." Id.
192. Beijing Resumes Talks on Joining World Trade Organisation, Agence France
Presse, May 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File.
193. See Prepared Testimony of Michael A. Samuels, supra note 11.
194. In fact, once China is in the WTO, Yew believes that there is a greater likeli-
hood that "[t]he United States ... can get China to commit to international rules on
trade and investment." Yang Razali Kassim, Commit China with WTO Entry, Bus.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1996, at 9, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
195. How US, Japan Can Help Integrate China into the World Community, supra note
105.
196. Id.; see also Kassim, supra note 194 (stating that membership in the WTO will
induce China to abide international rules on trade and investment). Yew argues that
"'China's membership of [sic] the WTO, with a reasonable period of transition as a de-
veloping country, will commit China, first to observe, and second to enforce international
rules on trade and investments."' Id. (quoting Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singa-
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tween the United States and other major trading nations with
China might lead to greater cooperation in other areas as well. 97
III. NEED TO RESOLVE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION
A. Problems Related to the Current WTO Structure
The current dispute over China's entry to the WTO is one
particularly significant situation where the lack of definition of de-
veloping countries has been a problem. Nonetheless, it is not the
only situation in which the lack of definition has been a significant
problem. Similar disputes have occurred in the past, and will recur
in the future.
1. Conflict over the Generalized System of Preferences. Prior
conflict between the United States and Europe, and certain
advanced developing countries, over the GATT's Generalized
System of Preferences illustrates the problems inherent in a WTO
system that lacks a formal procedure for determining when
countries cease to be considered developing countries. GSP is an
important program for developing countries, as it covers over $60
billion worth of exports each year--over 50% of the most-favored-
nation dutiable exports from developing countries into the member
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment. 9 ' Under the GATT, member countries may exempt
developing countries from some tariff obligations. In other words,
these developing countries may be permitted to maintain high
tariffs on imports to protect local businesses, while at the same
time taking advantage of developed countries' zero tariffs for
exports. All that is required is a bilateral agreement with another
country.
Conflict over these exceptions escalated in the late 1980s. In
1988, the United States stripped Singapore, South Korea, Hong
Kong and Taiwan of their preferential trade treatment under the
GSP. 99 Applying the domestic law implementing the GSP pro-
pore). WTO membership will help lock in China's current economic reforms and pro-
vide the incentive for future reforms, and will thus help further integrate China into the
world economy. See Prepared Testimony of Michael A. Samuels, supra note 11.
197. See id.
198. See UNCTAD Countries Reaffirm GSP Benefits but US Warns GSP Is Not Aid
Program, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 938 (May 27, 1992) [hereinafter UNC.
TAD Countries Reaffirm GSP].
199. See US Mixes Signals, JAPAN ECON. J., Feb. 27, 1988, at 26, available in LEXIS,
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gram, the United States determined that these "Four Tigers" no
longer should qualify for preferential treatment as developing
countries. For some time, members of the U.S. government
had believed that these newly industrialized countries (NICS) were
"mature competitors in some sectors, and no longer merit some
trade concessions granted when their industries were in their in-
fancy."'" There had been pressure in Congress for some time to
ensure that "GSP benefits should be redirected from fast growing
economies to more of the slower growing economies."' ' Because
the GSP is so valuable, the United States had become concerned
that the advanced developing countries were not "assuming re-
sponsibility for the world trading system by adhering fully and
promptly to the Uruguay Round and other trade agreements.""
The European Community followed the United States. In
1991, when implementing the Uruguay Round GATT talks, it
decided to stop recognizing Hong Kong, Singapore and South
Korea as developing countries.' 4 In 1994, the European Commu-
nity continued to reform its GSP program in order to "'increase
the export opportunities for the least-developed countries by
withdrawing GSP entitlement from countries that no longer need
the boost' of reduced tariffs in order to compete in the European
market."' 0 The European Commission determined that the most
Nexis Library, Non-U.S. File; Gary Hufbauer, Business Forum: On the Eve of GATT,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1986, at F3. The United States also graduated Bahrain, Bermuda,
Brunei Darussalam, and Nauru from GSP benefits because they all exceeded the per
capita income limit established by the United States. See Four Countries to be Graduated
from GSP for Exceeding Per Capita Limits, USTR Says, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
18, at 660 (May 4, 1988).
200. See US Mixes Signals, supra note 199. The GATr decision setting up the GSP
left it to individual member states to determine what countries would be eligible for the
benefits as developing countries. See GATT Decision, supra note 56. The United States
law implementing the GSP, created by GATT, sets a ceiling at countries who have a per
capita GNP exceeding $8,500. See US Mixes Signals, supra note 199. Singapore vigorously
protested the United States' move to drop them from GSP, and pointed out that in 1988
Singapore's per capita GNP was only $7,200. See id. South Korea also protested, arguing
that dropping them from GSP violated the GATT agreement. See id.
201. Tom Heneghan, REUTERS N. EUR. SERV., Oct. 18, 1982, Business News, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
202. Administration Will Look at GSP Countries' Adherence to Trade Pacts, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1307 (Aug. 2, 1995).
203. Barshefsky Testimony, supra note 29.
204. See William Dullforce, EC Stance Discriminates Among Developing Countries, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1991, at 4. The United States and the EU graduated different countries
from the GSP. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
205. European Commission Plans Major GSP Reform Next Year, 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
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advanced developing countries were reaping most of the benefits
of the GSP program because they were better able to export
products to the European Community.' In fact, 40 of the least-
developed countries reaped only 1% of the total GSP benefits
given.2X
Without clear WTO graduation criteria, such disputes will
continue into the future. As more developing countries advance, a
new round of fights over which nations should be excluded from
the program will ensue.2 For example, the Clinton administra-
tion has recently responded to Congressional pressure by targeting
Malaysia as a potential target for future graduation from the GSP
program.?
2. Future Members of the WTO. The WTO will soon have to
review applications for admission submitted by Russia, Taiwan and
Vietnam.210 These nations pose classification problems similar to
that posed by China, and there is already disagreement over which
criteria to use in assessing each of their applications.2  All three
(BNA) No. 23, at 917 (June 8, 1994) (quoting Pierre Defraigne, a senior European Com-
mission official in charge of North-South relations).
206. See id.
207. See id. "Graduation should correct this imbalance by excluding the products of
many advanced countries. It will take into account a country's level of development de-
fined as gross domestic product per capita and level of exports to the EU as well as its
share of the total EU imports for a specific sector." Id.
208. See, eg., Frances Williams, US May Face South Korean Challenge on Uruguay
Round, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at 7 (detailing a dispute over the exclusion of South
Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore). The United States gave the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative the right to designate which countries count as developing countries in applying the
subsidies accord. See id. This classification indicates the potential for escalation of ten-
sions with the NICs in areas other than over GSP. Hong Kong claims that the agree-
ment allows for "self-selection" to determine the status of a country, and challenges the
notion that the GATT or any developed nation has the right to classify its economy. See
id. South Korea announced that it voluntarily was liberalizing its policies for the period
of 1995-97 for imports that were currently restricted under protection that developing
countries could use under Article XVIIIB of the GATT Agreement. See South Korea
Tells GATT Council of Plans to Lift Import Restrictions, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
19, at 740 (May 11, 1994). Of course, such action is not completely "voluntary." The
United States, Japan and Australia had been pressuring South Korea to take such an
action, and even after South Korea acted, those three countries argued that South Korea
did not go far enough in terms of liberalization. See id. This is another example of the
problem of the ad-hoc nature of the GATT on graduation.
209. See Administration Will Look at GSP Countries' Adherence to Trade Pacts, supra
note 202, at 1307.
210. See Sandra Sugawara, WTO Trade Ministers Making Scant Progress; First General
Meeting Underway in Singapore, WAsHL POST, Dec. 12, 1996, at D1.
211. See WTO's North-South Dialogue, J. COM., Dec. 9, 1996, at 8A. There will be
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countries share aspects of highly developed countries in terms of
their economic power or potential, yet their standards of living are
more similar to countries in the developing world.212
The conflict over China's accession to the WTO, and the po-
tential for the same issue to arise when other nations such as Rus-
sia, Vietnam and Taiwan attempt to join the WTO, means that
the issue of what constitutes a developing country cannot be dis-
missed as just another "problem with China." Instead, the problem
is endemic to the WTO system and needs to be corrected. The
current negotiations with China offer an opportunity to resolve
this problem formally, as opposed to continually dealing with it on
an ad-hoc basis.
B. Solutions
Once it was enshrined in the GATT that developing countries
and developed countries were to be treated differently, developing
countries had no incentive to move themselves voluntarily into the
developed category, no matter how far their economies had
grown. 13 In the past, nations only made the move from develop-
ing to developed status in response to pressure from other GATT
members.2 4 Thus, in 1964, under pressure from other EU mem-
bers, Greece, Portugal and Spain renounced their status as devel-
oping countries under the GATT.21
At various times, some developed countries have attempted to
address the disincentives for developing countries to move volun-
tarily by setting specific graduation criteria.21 6 However, devel-
oping countries bitterly opposed such a plan; they did not want to
jump immediately from the more relaxed obligations imposed on
similar problems with the other former Soviet Republics and Saudi Arabia. See id.; see
also Alex Dacanay, Summit Leaves APEC Facing Action Test, NIKKEI WKLY., Dec. 2,
1996, at 21, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File (describing the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum's issuance of a moratorium on the admission of new mem-
bers in order to develop criteria for the evaluation of applicants).
212. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRENDS AND STATISTICS, supra note 189, at 13. For
example, Russia is 20th in the world in exports and 25th in imports. See id. Taiwan is
14th in exports and 15th in imports. See id.
213. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
214. See Kele Onyejekwe, International Law of Trade Preferences: Emanations from
the European Union and the United States, 26 ST. MARY'S Li. 425, 455 (1995).
215. See id.
216. See ANWARUL HODA, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRAD-
ING SYSTEM 56 (1987).
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developing countries to the much more stringent requirements set
for developed countries.217 The developing countries were wary
of allowing developed countries to unilaterally decide which coun-
tries would be required to advance to the developed level.
218
The more advanced developing countries wanted to maintain the
relaxed developing country standards for themselves so they could
protect their own industries, while taking advantage of the devel-
oped countries' open markets which had been brought about by
the stringent obligations imposed on them.219 In addition, if the
more advanced developing countries must lose their status as
developing countries, they do not want to be required to immedi-
ately jump to the level of the United States, Japan and the Eu-
ropean Community.'
The opposition to a plan setting graduation criteria was suc-
cessful; the efforts of developed countries to incorporate a provi-
sion in the original GATT agreement allowing the application of
the graduation principle failed."1 Since these earlier efforts,
there has not been a formal codification of graduation criteria in
any international trade agreement.'
Instead of a formal graduation process, major economic play-
ers, such as the United States and the European Union, have
made their own ad hoc graduation decisions, especially in the area
of the GSP.' These individual, ad hoc decisions about GSP re-
newal have caused the developing world to refer to them as "arbi-
trary and restrictive results."' The bulk of developing countries
do not believe the United States and the European Community's
claim that they are graduating countries to ensure that the needier
countries get the bulk of the benefits.' C.S. Nagaratnam of Sri
Lanka, speaking for the "Group of 77" (developing countries
within the UN), argued that the "U.S. system of accelerated GSP
graduation now prevailing in Washington has resulted in 'a drastic
217. See id,
218. See id.
219. See Hufbauer, supra note 199, at F3.
220. See id.
221. See HODA, supra note 216, at 56.
222. See id.
223. See supra Part III.A.1.
224. UNCTAD Countries Reaffirm GSP, supra note 198, at 938 (quoting Ernst August
Hoerig, Chairman of 1992 UNCTAD meeting).
225. See Developing Countries Charge Program Fails to Live Up to Promise, Blame
United States, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 851, 852 (June 8, 1988).
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loss of benefits' . . . challenging the U.S. claim that the new sys-
tem is aimed at achieving a better distribution of GSP bene-
fits."22
The perception of unfairness may have arisen because the
powerful developed countries do not seem to have neutral criteria
defining developing countries and graduation requirements and
because there is no international consensus on those issues. In
fact, international attempts to devise a workable compromise be-
tween developed and developing countries have failed.' Devel-
oping countries accused the industrialized countries of attempting
to turn GSP into "'an instrument to make developing countries
more pliable. "'
The past fight over graduation indicates two lessons: develop-
ing countries do not want a system imposed on them by devel-
oped nations without their participation, and if developing coun-
tries must accept some form of graduation, they do not want a
system where they must fit into one of two categories. From these
two lessons emerges a possible solution. First, the WTO should
develop a set of economic criteria to assess the development level
of each nation in the WTO. Second, the WTO should create a
middle category between developing and developed in which to
place emerging economies. Countries in this category will have
more requirements than developing countries, but fewer than
developed countries. Third, a regular review process should occur
within the WTO to assess each member and determine whether or
not they should be moved up or down, based upon their recent
economic performance.
1. Set up a Clear Criterion. Under the auspices of the WTO,
representatives from a wide range of economic development levels
should meet to seek a consensus on a criterion to measure a
nation's economic development level. There can only be a solution
if the process of coming up with this criterion involves members
from all levels of economic development. Ernst August Hoerig,
Chairman of United Nations Conference on Trade and
226. Id. at 852.
227. See UNCTAD Group Criticizes U.S. Extension Bill But Fails to Agree on Recom-
mended Revisions, 1 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 971 (May 9, 1984).
228. Id. (quoting Syrian delegate Ahmed Saker speaking on behalf of developing na-
tions).
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Development (UNCTAD), argues that "[o]bjective and rational
criteria for such treatment would be the best way to avoid such
unwanted and often discriminatory results."' There is at least
the awareness among most countries "of the need to convene and
establish a common set of rules of behavior," and the WTO
framework could be used to expand this awareness into some
consensus of a fair criterion.
Economic development literature suggests three factors that
could be used to determine a country's level of development: 1)
sustained increases in a country's GNP; 2) rate of growth of a
country's per capita GNP; and 3) an increase in the importance of
manufacturing and service industries, coupled with a decrease in
the percent of the population working in agriculture." Although
significant, these three factors alone do not predict a country's
ability to compete in international trade. Merely looking at the
percent of the population engaged in manufacturing and service
does not indicate whether a nation will be able to compete suc-
cessfully. It seems logical that a world trading organization would
also examine factors that would show a country's promise in inter-
national trade when determining a measurement for that country's
economic development level.
229. UNCTAD Countries Reaffinn GSP, supra note 198, at 938.
230. Id.
231. See MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WoRLD 68,
83-84 (1981); see also Amy Chua, Ethno-Economics, Ethno-Politics: The Underside of
Markets, Democracy, and Law in the Developing World 8 (Jan. 8, 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (using low per capita income, low rates of labor pro-
ductivity, and a high proportion of population engaged in agriculture to identify underde-
veloped countries). One suggestion has been made to divide the GATT into a tiered
system with four categories: developed, newly developing, developing, and less developed.
See Roshani M. Gunewardene, GATT and the Developing World: Is a New Principle of
Trade Liberalization Needed?, 15 MO. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 45, 67 (1991). However, Mr.
Gunewardene does not define what criteria would be used to place countries in such
categories. Sustained increases in GNP and growth in per capita GNP are important be-
cause they measure the strength of a country's economy, both overall and at an individu-
al level. See Onyejekwe, supra note 214, at 455-56. The Organization for Economic
Counsel and Development (OECD) uses $1300 per capita GNP as the dividing line be-
tween low income and middle income nations. See id The World Bank uses $2000 per
capita GNP as the line between low income and upper middle income countries. See id.
The change from agriculture to manufacturing and services is important because it mea-
sures the sophistication of a country's economy. It also may be a proxy for how many
products a country will have to export.
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The academic literature has also suggested other factors to
define levels of development. 2 Those factors include income
distribution, unemployment level, and existence of social safety
nets to help the poor.'~ Although these factors may be impor-
tant in assessing the overall success of a nation, they seem irrele-
vant to a nation's ability to compete internationally in exports.
Outside the academic world, various criteria have been used
to measure levels of development. The United States government
uses a country's per capita income as the critical factor in deter-
mining whether that country should be considered developing or
developed.' However, per capita income alone may not indicate
the sophistication of the overall economy; it does not adequately
measure international competitiveness in specific products.' 5 An
alternative approach is employed by the Dutch Ministry of Devel-
opment Cooperation. It looks at three factors to determine wheth-
er a country is developing: 1) GNP per capita; 2) percentage share
of manufacturing in GNP; and 3) export performance by product
group of each developing country relative to all developing coun-
try exports.z6 The additional criteria used by the Dutch are
more accurate, but still incomplete because the criteria ignore
overall GNP and thus fail to illustrate the overall magnitude of a
nation's economy. A former Mexican government official has
suggested that, at a minimum, a country should be considered to
have advanced beyond developing country status when it has in-
dustrialized to the point where it can offer competitive manufac-
tured goods for export, and has a per capita income of more than
$1,000 per year. 7 Although useful, this criteria is also incom-
plete because it ignores the raw size of a nation's economy, and
fails to look at that nation's actual success in international trade.
232. See TODARO, supra note 231, at 69.
233. See id. at 68-72, 83-91.
234. See UNCTAD Head Issues Plea to Tie New GATT MTN to Broader Review of
Third World Concerns, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 932 (July 17, 1985) [herein-
after UNCTAD Head Issues Plea]; see also Barshefsky Testimony, supra note 29 (noting
that a recently introduced bill would reduce the per capita GNP limit for the GSP pro-
gram from about $11,800 to about $8600).
235. See UNCTAD Head Issues Plea, supra note 234, at 932.
236. See HODA, supra note 216, at 62.
237. See David Ibarra & Salvador Arriola, NICs Are New International Powerhouses;
But the Question Is: Is the Change Permanent in World Economic Stability?, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 7, 1982, at 33.
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The above discussion indicates the factors that are important
in assessing a nation's economic development level in the context
of international trade. This Note proposes the following criteria to
be used as a basis for determining how to measure development:
1) GNP; 2) per capita GNP; 3) percent of economy involved in
manufacturing and service industries; and 4) export success, as
measured by value of prior years' exports, variety of exports, and
existence of a trade deficit or surplus. These four factors measure
a nation's ability to successfully compete in international trade.
GNP is a an important measure because it offers a bench-
mark to analyze the economy as a whole. Per capita GNP, or
income, is important because it gives more context to the overall
GNP, as it reflects the population of an economy. Both measures
are important because if only GNP were used, a very large coun-
try, such as China, would appear to be more developed than a
much smaller country, such as Canada, merely because China has
a higher GNP. However, when per capita GNP is factored in, the
analysis changes dramatically because that measurement reflects
the fact that Canada has far fewer people, and equalizes the mea-
surement. This does not mean that GNP is a faulty measure, be-
cause there is significance in the overall size of an economy, but it
must be tempered with the per capita GNP.
Percentage of population involved in industry and service is
important because it looks to whether the country has moved
away from an agricultural-based economy to a more sophisticated
economy. A country with a large industrial and service base might
be expected to compete well in the international economy. But,
alone, this factor can also be misleading because it may treat a
country that is highly dependent on one product as being sophisti-
cated in all aspects of trade, which might not be the case. Thus, a
country that only exports one raw material might have a high
percentage of the population involved in service or industry, but
still not have a sophisticated economy such that it can compete
successfully in all aspects of international trade. Thus, it is also
important to look at value of exports, variety of exports, and the
existence of a trade deficit or surplus. Those factors provide more
evidence of the overall sophistication of a country's economy.
The WTO should use its criteria to measure the ability of a
nation to successfully compete in international trade without the
need for significant protection, as is commonly given to developing
countries. These four criteria offer a mechanism by which the
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WTO could evaluate a country's development level, with an eye
toward that country's ability to engage in international trade with-
out the need for much help. Thus, a nation that had low ranks on
the four criteria would not be as successful in international trade,
so would be in need of more protection for its local industries,
than a more advanced country that had greater success in interna-
tional trade. Such an advanced country would not need as much
protection for its local industries.
2. Set up a Middle Category for Emerging Economies. It was
once easy to divide the countries of the world into two camps:
North and South. 8 Any such attempt to do that today would
result in a "vast oversimplification" because using economic cri-
teria, the old "South" is now made up of various "distinct eco-
nomic categories."' 9 Ethiopia and Singapore illustrate the stark
changes that have occurred in the "South." 24°
For 1994, the growth rate in the developing world was twice
that of the developed world.24' This can be explained by the
high growth rates in the transition economies in Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe, and the developing countries in Asia and Latin
America.242 This increase in GNP in the developing world was
also followed by a significant increase in world merchandise tr-
ade.24' Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand had a combined $420 billion worth of exports in
1994.24 Latin America added $185 billion in exports, and Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe combined for $120 billion in exports.24
Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, Malaysia,
Russia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia are all among the
top 30 exporters in the world.246 This indicates that we can no
longer speak of one monolithic developing world.
The WTO, in some cases, has already divided the "South"
into two categories: developing countries and "lower-income devel-
238. See Brown, supra note 41, at 356-57 n.33.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRENDS AND STATISTICS, supra note 189, at 75.
242. See Ud.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See Ud.
246. See id-
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oping countries."'247 Under this classification, the 48 poorest
countries, as defined by the United Nations, are lower-income
developing countries, but only 29 are WTO members.2€ This
bottom category makes sense for the limited number of countries
it covers, but it still leaves every other non-developed country
within the broad "developing country" category.2 49 Because de-
veloping country is an overly broad category, it remains necessary
to create an intermediate category between developing country
and developed country.
The idea of an intermediate category has been discussed for
many years. In 1982, there was some sentiment favoring creation
of a middle category for the NICs; they would "pay tariffs some-
where between the GSP level and the rate paid by industrialised
countries."' Thus the "rapidly developing third world states ...
have become mature competitors in certain sectors and no longer
deserve some of the trade concessions granted them when their
industries were in their infancy." 1 At that time, the Director-
General of GATT, Arthur Dunkel, suggested the institution of a
new middle category for those countries that had achieved a high-
er level of development. Countries in the middle would accept
more responsibilities of being GATT members, but would also
gain more privileges. 2 These privileges might include promises
that the NICs will not be pressured to pay higher wages as a
result of their success in labor-intensive production or to submit to
"voluntary" export limits to developed countries. 3
The creation of a middle category seems to be a reasonable
compromise for all sides. It would ease many of the concerns held
by the United States that advanced developing countries not be
treated the same as those that are less advanced. This could be
accomplished by setting higher requirements for trade liberaliza-
tion for the emerging economies than for other developing coun-
tries, but still keeping the requirements lower than those borne by
true developed countries such as the United States. This new
247. Lower-income Developing Countries and the WTO (visited Mar. 9, 1997) <http://-
www.wto.org/wtofWhats_new/qadev.htm>.
248. See id,
249. See id.
250. Heneghan, supra note 201.
251. Id.
252. See GATT Director Decries Protectionism, supra note 24, at 942.
253. See id.
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category also would ease the frustration felt by emerging econo-
mies at being told that they must immediately take on all of the
requirements of a developed country.
3. Set up Formal Mechanism Within GATT to Review
Members. The WTO treaty should be amended to create a formal
committee to analyze member countries' economies. This
committee would reassess every member's standing every five
years, to determine whether they are candidates for graduation,
either from developing country to the new middle category or
from the new middle category to developed country. All member
states should be represented on this committee. Setting up a
formal mechanism within the WTO is preferable to a regime in
which the United States and European Union make unilateral
decisions that affect the developing world, and including members
of developing countries will lessen tensions. This committee would
analyze each member state based on the four factors discussed
above. It would then determine if the state should remain in its
present category for the next five years, or if it should be moved
up or down. As with most decisions made by the WTO, it would
take a two-thirds vote of all members of the committee to change
a country from its present status.
C. Analysis of China Under Proposed Four Economic Factors
China shares characteristics of both developed and developing
countries. An analysis of the Chinese economy in light of the four
factors outlined above, however, suggests that China is neither a
developed nor a developing country, but should be placed in the
new emerging economies category. First, China's GNP is $2 tril-
lion. Based on overall GNP, it recently surpassed Germany to
become the third-largest economy in the world.25 Furthermore,
its GNP has been growing at a rate of approximately 10% per
254. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACr, supra note 1, at 835. China's GNP is larger than
that of many countries widely acknowledged as developing countries: Algeria ($41 bil-
lion), Argentina ($278 billion), Bangladesh ($26 billion), India ($287 billion), Mexico
($363 billion), and Zaire ($6 billion). See id. China's overall GNP is also larger than that
of many developed countries: Austria ($196 billion), Canada ($523 billion), the United
Kingdom ($1 trillion), and France ($1.3 trillion). See id. It is, however, smaller than that
of some developed countries, including Japan ($4.6 trillion) and the United States ($6.7
trillion). See id.
255. See id.
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year since the early 1980s, giving it one of the highest growth
rates in the world. 6 While growth is not explicitly a factor, it is
relevant to the size of GNP and provides a very strong indication
of the overall strength of China's economy and suggests that Chi-
na is like many developed countries. Second, China's per capita
GNP is $1860 This is higher than many developing countries,
including Bangladesh and Algeria, but not as high as some of the
more advanced developing countries, including Chile and Mexi-
co." This factor suggests that China is also like many develop-
ing countries. Third, although China has a fairly large industrial
capacity, it, still has a very significant percentage of the population
leading an absolute subsistence existence as farmers. 9 Again, by
itself, this factor suggests that China might fit within the develop-
ing country category. The fourth factor, success in international
trade, indicates that China is more like a developed country, as it
has been quite successful. It has a trade surplus of $5 billion with
the rest of the world.2" China is also the eleventh largest export-
er in the world."'
Thus, China shows great strength in overall GNP and interna-
tional success, but less strength in per capita GNP and economic
maturity. Because of these mixed results China should not be a
developed country. However, the size of China's economy cannot
be ignored; this necessitates the creation of a new middle cate-
gory. This category would recognize the overall size of China's
economy, yet also recognize that the economic growth has not yet
pervaded all of society yet. The Asian Tigers present the reverse
256. See NIXON, supra note 5, at 121.
257. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 835.
258. China's per capita GNP is higher than that in many developing countries: Algeria
($1452); Bangladesh ($206); Ethiopia ($91); India ($312); and Zaire ($133). See id. It is,
however, lower than other developed countries: Austria ($24,600); Canada ($18,600);
France ($22,760); Japan ($37,000); The United Kingdom ($17,670); and the United States
($25,810). See id. It is also lower than that in some developing countries: Argentina
($8205), Chile ($3609); and Mexico ($3940). See id.
259. See Global Multilateral Trading Systems: The Role of the PRC, supra note 108.
260. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACt, supra note 1, at 853. China has a $60 million trade
surplus with the United States. See id. Most developing countries have huge trade def-
icits: Mexico ($18.9 billion); India ($5.1 billion). See id. Even most developed countries
have trade deficits, as do the United States and the United Kingdom. See id.
261. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRENDS AND STATISTICS, supra note 189, at 75.
China exported $121 billion in 1994. See id.; see also Global Multilateral Trading Systems:
The Role of the PRC, supra note 108, at 4 (stating that China counts for 3% of total
world merchandise trade and therefore is the 11th largest trading nation in the world).
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situation. They have lower overall GNP levels than developed
countries, although higher than most all developing countries, but
their GNP per capita is much higher than other developing coun-
tries. For example, South Korea has a $356 billion GNP and
$7896 per capita GNP. Thus, the Asian Tigers or NICs would be
part of the new middle group as well, based on the size of their
economies.
This simple exercise of applying the four factors to China un-
derscores the problems the other proposed criteria had. It demon-
strates how the choice of factors can skew the picture. For in-
stance, under the United States' criteria of looking only at per
capita GNP, China appears to be a classic example of a develop-
ing country because of its relatively low per capita GNP. By ap-
plying the criteria from the academic literature, the per capita
GNP and percentage of population in manufacturing criteria also
would strongly suggest that China was a developing country, with
only its GNP to counterbalance that conclusion. The four factor
analysis utilized by this Note offers a more complete picture of a
nation's economy.
CONCLUSION
Creating a new middle category within the WTO recognizes
the reality that developing countries are not a monolithic block.
There are huge variations within the developing world, and those
differences must be taken into account when the international
community assigns economic responsibilities. Unless the world
community recognizes those differences, some countries will be
getting bonuses that they do not deserve at the expense of coun-
tries who truly need the help. In addition to these issues of fair-
ness, public support for free trade in developed countries is erod-
ed when the public sees powerful economies taking advantage of
preferences they no longer need. Thus, to preserve an internation-
al system of free trade, it is important to ensure that every nation
participates to the extent that it is able, which means that coun-
tries like South Korea, and ultimately China, will have to do more
than their third world counterparts who are not yet as advanced.
The stakes are very high. If the world community does not
resolve the issue, China will either be kept out of the WTO, or
will use the developing country preferences to reap an unfair
advantage over its competitors. In the final analysis, China must
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be pressured to further liberalize its economy, but that goal can
best be served by including China at the table as a member of the
WTO.262
262. See R. Thomas Bemer, Let China Into the WTO, Then Work to Reform It,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNrroR, Oct. 7, 1996, at 19.
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